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The number of women winning seats in US House of Representative elections has increased
dramatically in recent years. And yet women currently hold only 19 percent of House seats, a ﬁgure
which has remained relatively constant since 2002.  Some argue that unique barriers to entering
politics can explain this lack of female representation while others attribute it to a “gender penalty”
imposed on female candidates by voters and campaign donors.  In an analysis of primaries for
House seats between 1982 and 2012, L. Jason Anastasopoulos ﬁnds no evidence that voters and
campaign contributors engage in overt gender discrimination against female candidates. He argues
that that current low levels of female representation are likely to be better explained by unique
barriers to entering politics that women face.
Since the 1980s the number of female representatives and the number of female candidates running for oﬃce in US
House of Representative general elections increased fourfold from 5 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 2012.
Figure 1 – Proportion of female candidates running in House of Representative general elections, 1980–
2012
After the number of women holding House seats doubled between 1992 and 2002, many believed that women
would reach parity with men shortly after the beginning of the new millennium.  What actually occurred, however,
was signiﬁcant decline in the rate at which women were entering, and winning, House races after 2002. As Figure 1
shows, the proportion of female candidates skyrocketed after 1990, but remained relatively constant after 2002
prompting many to wonder why the growth of female politicians in the House had eﬀectively stopped.
Research on the role that gender bias plays in limiting the number of female representatives is mixed. Some ﬁnd that
even though gender stereotypes exist among potential voters, they do not hurt female candidates. Most
observational studies which estimate the eﬀects of gender on election outcomes ﬁnd that female candidates tend to
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raise as much money and win general elections as often as males while others have found that after controlling for
candidate “quality”, women do signiﬁcantly worse than men, on average.
Research on gender discrimination by campaign contributors is also mixed. Some ﬁnd that women tend to raise less
money than men on average while others ﬁnd that women tend to be better at raising campaign contributions than
men, but they also have to work signiﬁcantly harder per dollar earned to secure these contributions.
These contradictory ﬁndings demonstrate some of the hazards that omitted variables bias can pose. Sarah Fulton
makes this point particularly clear because without the control for candidate “quality” she ﬁnds no female electoral
disadvantage, but with it, a signiﬁcant disadvantage emerges.
Of course, even if we were able to control for all of the observed diﬀerences between male and female candidates,
there may be unobserved and/or unmeasured diﬀerences between male and female candidates that are correlated
relevant outcomes such as election returns and campaign contributions which could aﬀect causal estimates.
Is there causal evidence of gender discrimination against female candidates? 
To correct for this and assess whether voters or campaign contributors levy a “gender penalty” against female
candidates, I use a causal inference technique known as a regression discontinuity design. This technique is based
on the intuitive idea that when a cutoﬀ value determines whether a group receives a treatment, people who are
barely above and barely below that cutoﬀ value receive that treatment by chance. For example, if a scholarship
required a minimum SAT score of 1300, students scoring slightly above a 1300 receive the scholarship while those
scoring slightly below 1300 do not. For this group of students, we can claim that they received the scholarship by
chance, even though their academic abilities are similar. The way that the treatment is allocated allows us to better
estimate the causal eﬀects of a treatment on a relevant outcome.
In the case of male and female candidates in US House of Representative elections, the institutional selection
mechanism which determines whether a male or female candidate will run in the general election are the primaries.
And, as it turns out, within a special subset of primaries, two candidate, partisan House primaries in which a male-
candidate barely wins against a female candidate and vice-versa, a male or a female Republican or Democratic
candidate will be nominated by their party to run in the general election by chance.
Figure 2  – Regression discontinuity design setup
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This is illustrated in Figure 2 above.  For our purposes, the “treatment” is whether a male or a female candidate will
be nominated by their party to run in the general election and the “scores” are the female House primary vote margin
(simply the vote share of the female candidate minus the vote share of the male candidate) within parties. Thus, for
example, if a female Republican candidate barely lost to a male Republican candidate in the primaries, that female
candidate was nominated to run in the general election by chance and vice versa.
With this framework, we are then able to isolate the causal eﬀect of gender on various general election outcomes.
Because we are interested in whether voters or campaign donors discriminate against female candidates, we
explore the eﬀects of candidate gender on three primary outcomes: general election vote share, individual
contributions and PAC contributions. If female candidates that are electorally similar to male candidates receive
fewer proportional votes in the general election, this would provide strong evidence in favor of voter gender bias
against female candidates.
Figure 3  – General election vote share for male v. female winners of close primaries with 1 percent bins
3/6
Note: Dotted lines are 95 percent conﬁdence bands.
Figure 3 presents average general election vote share results for male (left of dotted vertical line) and female
candidates (right of dotted vertical line).  If voters tended to discriminate against female candidates of similar quality
to male candidates, we would expect to see that the beginning of the line on the right hand side of the plot would fall
well below the end of the line on the left hand side of the plot. Instead we see no gap, suggesting that male and
female candidates nominated by chance receive a roughly equal general election vote share.
We ﬁnd similar patterns when comparing contributions from individuals and political action committees (PACs),
shown in Figures 4 and 5 below.
Figure 4 – Log total individual contributions for male and female winners of close primaries, 1 percent bins.
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Note: Dotted lines are 95 percent conﬁdence bands.
Figure 5  – Log Total PAC contributions for male and female winners of close primaries, 1 percent bins
Note: Dotted lines are 95 percent conﬁdence bands.
Taken together, these results suggest that similar male and female political candidates do not appear to face a
gender penalty from voters, individual campaign contributors or PAC contributors.
The fact remains, however, that women occupy only 19 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives and
this trend does not appear to be improving over time. These results and other data suggest that this may be due to
unique barriers to entering politics that women face which should be explored in greater detail. In 2016, for example,
out of the 2,421 House candidates that ﬁled with the Federal Election Commission, only 272 or 11.2 percent of those
candidates running were women.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Estimating the gender penalty in House of Representative elections using a
regression discontinuity design’ in Electoral Studies.
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